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Abstract 
The research of Dr. Bent Flyvbjerg in the 1990s and early 2000s showed that urban rail 
projects often cost more than estimated and carried fewer riders, a troubling trend suggesting that 
the planning forecasts for urban rail projects were too optimistic. Inspired by that research, this 
analysis seeks to extend that work to analyze bus rapid transit projects. 
A study of forecasted versus actual costs and ridership was conducted for eighteen bus 
rapid transit projects in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New 
Zealand. Of the seventeen projects for which cost data could be found, the cost projections for 
seven were within 5% of the actual cost, illustrating that the cost projections for these projects 
tended to be more accurate than the urban rail forecasts Flyvbjerg studied. However, these 
projects still leaned towards under estimating the final cost, with eight exceeding the projected 
cost by at least 5%, compared to only two that underestimated it by at least 5%. Ridership 
projections were evenly distributed between those that over or under estimated the actual 
ridership, but tended to be far more inaccurate than the cost projections; of the fourteen projects 
for which ridership data could be found, the actual ridership for only four of those projects came 
within 10% of what was forecast. Further research would be necessary to see if these trends hold 
true for other bus rapid transit projects as it becomes a more popular technological choice for 
rapid transit investment around the world, but this analysis suggests that current forecasting 
methods may leave much to be desired. 
Introduction 
When it was published, the research of Dr. Bent Flyvbjerg illustrated a consistent 
inaccuracy of urban rail transit project forecasts in regards to cost and ridership. Compared to 
road and highway projects, which showed an even distribution in terms of (in)accuracy, urban 
rail projects were consistently projected under the actual cost and with overly optimistic 
ridership predictions. Based on these findings, Flyvbjerg called for greater accountability over 
forecasts of large-scale transportation projects (Flyvbjerg, 2005). 
My analysis poses a related question: do bus rapid transit projects have similarly 
inaccurate projections? In the past several years, bus rapid transit (BRT) has become an 
increasingly popular option for city and local governments when investing in rapid transit. At a 
time when many transit agencies are experiencing budget cuts and service reductions, the 
relatively low capital costs of BRT make it an attractive option for agencies looking to expand 
their rapid transit services. In North America alone, there will be 32 BRT projects completed or 
under construction in 2014 (Freemark, 2014). 
Much has been written about the characteristics of BRT and the current state of BRT 
development, and there is a substantial body of research regarding the economic and 
development impacts of a BRT system, but there is much less research regarding BRT ridership 
and cost forecasts. And while there is a large body of work on travel forecasts, most obviously 
Flyvbjerg’s research, most of it pertains specifically to freeway or urban rail projects. Given the 
growing interest in bus rapid transit systems among local governments and transportation 
professionals, this is a gap in the current research that I decided to explore. 
Literature review 
There is a large and growing body of research on bus rapid transit, most of which 
generally fits into one of three categories: 1) the basic characteristics of BRT, 2) the current state 
of BRT development, and 3) the economic and development impacts of BRT. Additionally, in 
each of these categories there is much research comparing the characteristics and impacts of 
BRT to those of other forms of rapid transit, particularly light rail. 
A substantial amount of work has been written about the service characteristics of urban 
transportation modes, including BRT, and this work offers useful parameters for defining BRT 
systems and the opportunities for its development. This research attempted to define the level of 
service characteristics at which point a system can be considered “bus rapid transit” and found 
that BRT is growing in popularity due to its cost effectiveness and the fact that it can be adapted 
for use in conventional bus systems (Vuchic, 1992) (Jarzab, Lightbody, and Maeda, 2002) 
(Levinson, Zimmerman, Clinger, and Rutherford, 2002). Additionally, the Institute for 
Transportation Policy (ITDP), a non-profit organization that provides technical assistance on 
public transportation projects and advocates for BRT development, has developed a ranking 
system for comparing BRT systems and determining whether a system meets their standards for 
what can be considered “true” BRT, and argues that the state of BRT development in the United 
States is behind many other countries due to the relatively few high-quality “true” BRT systems 
in the U.S. (Weinstock, Hook, Replogle, and Cruz, 2011). This research proved useful for 
understanding the characteristics of BRT and what could, even nominally, be considered as such. 
Another aspect of BRT that has seen a lot of analysis is the land use and economic 
development impacts of BRT projects. In general, this work found that BRT systems had the 
potential to generate significant impacts on the built environment and local economy. In some 
instances, studies have found that close proximity and accessibility to BRT stations have 
generated higher property values, most notably in Seoul, South Korea (Cervero and Kang, 2011), 
Beijing, China (Nelson and Deng, 2010), and Bogota, Columbia (Rodriguez and Mojica, 2009). 
Even within the United States, BRT systems in Cleveland and Pittsburgh have spurred 
significant investment in the communities along the BRT corridor (Hook, Weinstock, and 
Lotshaw, 2013). However, this research didn’t directly relate to the question I was looking to 
address, being the accuracy of BRT forecast models, so unfortunately it proved to be of little 
assistance in my research. 
As the inspiration for my proposed research, Flyvbjerg’s work was naturally very 
important as a model for my research. Building on a body of work from the 1990s and early 
2000s, this research examined the accuracy of cost and ridership forecasts for large 
transportation projects, particularly urban rail and road projects, and found that urban rail 
projects frequently exhibited large cost overruns and typically presented very optimistic ridership 
forecasts compared with road projects, due in part to poor forecasting methods and also due to 
biases on part of the forecasters to promote rail projects (Flyvbjerg et al., 1997, 2002, 2003, 
2005, 2007). However, none of this work dealt with bus transit projects, hence the gap in the 
current literature I hoped to address. 
Methodology 
Data was collected over a three month period on BRT systems in the United States, 
Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. In large part, I was dependent on a 
contact at the transit agency operating the BRT system to supply me with information on cost 
and ridership estimates for these projects. While funding and ridership information is collected 
by federal government agencies, such as the Federal Transit Agency in the United States, most of 
this information deals with transit agencies as a whole rather than individual BRT projects. Many 
of the transit agencies I contacted did not respond to my requests for information; of the nearly 
thirty agencies I contacted, only eleven provided me with the necessary information. In a few 
instances where the agency did not respond, I was able to find the necessary information through 
media articles or government reports, but in most of these instances I was unable to find reliable 
and comparable data. As such, there are unfortunately many BRT systems in operation in these 
five countries that are not included in this analysis. In total, eighteen BRT projects are included 
in the final analysis. 
The methodologies Flyvbjerg employed in his research served as a guide for this analysis. 
Many projects go through multiple forecasts which change as a project moves forward through 
the design and construction phases. In his research, Flyvbjerg used the project forecasts from the 
time of the decision to build, arguing that this is the information available to decision makers 
when they agree to move forward on a project, and thus the most influential in determining the 
worthiness of a project. These figures were then compared to the actual figures from the 
completion of the project to determine their accuracy (Flyvbjerg, 2005). This is, in brief, what I 
attempted to do in my analysis. 
Given the small number of “true” BRT systems in these countries – that is, systems 
which have nearly all or all of the features of bus rapid transit, such as dedicated lanes, pre-
boarding payment, limited stops, and branded service – this analysis also included some “BRT-
lite” systems – systems with only a few of the features of bus rapid transit – and some busway 
projects to produce a statistically significant sample of BRT projects. While not all these systems 
are what would be deemed “true” BRT, they do all represent significant investments in public 
transit for each of the cities included here, so their value in an analysis of large-scale 
transportation projects shouldn’t necessarily be dismissed. 
Hypothesis 
Due to BRT being a less prestigious transit mode compared to urban rail, as well as being 
less expensive in terms of capital costs, I predicted that the cost estimates for BRT projects 
would generally be more accurate than those for the urban rail projects that Flyvbjerg studied. In 
terms of ridership forecasts, I didn’t have any solid expectations, but presumed that those would 
also prove to be more accurate than those for the urban rail projects that Flyvbjerg studied due to 
the generally shorter time horizons for BRT construction, which could translate to more accurate 
predictions of ridership. Indeed, I came to see the ridership question as the more important issue 
my research could address, given that I had no clear expectations from the outset and hoped my 
research could fill a gap in the existing literature. 
Individual case studies 
Auckland, New Zealand 
The Northern Busway, a dedicated busway that links Auckland City with the suburbs of 
the North Shore, was New Zealand’s first dedicated busway when it officially opened in 
February 2008. Built as a joint venture between Transit New Zealand, the North Shore City 
Council, the Auckland City Council, and the Auckland Regional Transport Authority, the project 
consists of a 6.2 km (3.9 miles) dedicated two-lane busway running parallel to a major highway 
and five large stations that serve bus operations along the route. 
Estimates for the project significantly underestimated the project cost, and a major 
reevaluation of the costs of the project had to be taken during the detailed design and 
procurement phases of the project. This was due primarily to significant increases in property 
acquisition costs for the busway stations, the fact that the design cost estimates for the stations 
lacked reliable civil engineering estimates, and changes in Transit New Zealand’s project 
estimation practices. All told, the initial busway project estimates of NZD $120 million in capital 
costs, or NZD $30.77 million per mile (USD $29.89 million in 2014), fell far below the actual 
capital costs of NZD $180 million upon completion of the busway (S. Paton, personal 
communication, January 29, 2014), or NZD $46.15 million per mile in 2008 (USD $44.77 
million in 2014). 
Despite the added expenses, reports indicate that ridership on the Northern Busway has 
far exceeded expectations (S. Paton, personal communication, January 29, 2014), and a second 
busway is currently planned for the Auckland region. Unfortunately, I was unable to acquire 
exact ridership estimates for the Northern Busway project, so I have chosen not to include it in 
my final ridership analysis. 
Cambridgeshire, United Kingdom 
The Cambridgeshire Guided Busway is a guided bus system that connects the city of 
Cambridge with the communities of Huntingdon and St Ives in the English county of 
Cambridgeshire. The longest guided busway in the world, it opened in August 2011 and is made 
up of two guided sections which have a combined length of 16 miles. The busway serves 
specially adapted buses which are guided by the busway’s track, thus eliminating the need for the 
operator to steer the bus (Cambridgeshire County Council, 2012). 
Cost overruns were a significant problem with the project, with the busway going £36 
million over budget (Havergal, 2013). When approved in 2005, the project was projected to cost 
£116 million, or £7.25 million per mile (USD $13.84 million in 2014) when completed, but 
delays, rising construction costs, and a lawsuit between the Cambridgeshire County Council and 
the private contractor caused construction costs to rise to £152 million (Havergal, 2013), or £9.5 
million per mile (USD $12.55 million in 2014). However, ridership has been very strong on the 
busway, exceeding expectations: forecasts had predicted 1.75 million passenger trips on the 
busway in the first year, but actual ridership was more than 40% above this number, reaching 2.5 
million passenger trips in the first year (Cambridgeshire County Council, 2012). 
Cleveland, Ohio 
The HealthLine, operated by the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority 
(GCRTA), is a 7.1 mile bus rapid transit line that serves Euclid Avenue between Downtown 
Cleveland and East Cleveland, linking two of the region’s largest employment centers. Opened 
in October 2008, the system was named following the purchase of naming rights by a consortium 
of the Cleveland Clinic and University Hospitals, two major health care institutions in the Euclid 
corridor. The Institute for Transportation & Development Policy gave the HealthLine the highest 
ranking of any BRT system in the United States, indicating that they consider it the most 
complete example of bus rapid transit in the U.S. (Weinstock, Hook, Replogle, and Cruz, 2011). 
4.4 miles of the line utilize exclusive bus lanes in the median of Euclid Avenue, while the 
remaining 2.7 miles are operated in mixed-traffic curb lanes serving sidewalk stops. All stations 
and stops have distinctive structures, off-board fare equipment, and other amenities, and 
HealthLine vehicles have signal priority at traffic intersections (FTA, 2012). 
Capital costs for the HealthLine were $197.2 million in 2008 dollars ($27.77 million per 
mile in 2008, or $30.28 million in 2014), which was actually far below initial estimates. A 1995 
estimate set the budget at $273.4 million when adjusted to 2008 dollars, or $38.51 million per 
mile ($41.99 million in 2014), but further revisions set estimates ranging from $248.2 million to 
$317.4 million in 2008 dollars. Due to cost effectiveness requirements to receive federal funding, 
GCRTA trimmed costs for design elements and vehicle procurement, and utilized management 
tools to monitor the project budget. In the end, they were able to complete the project below any 
of their estimates (GCRTA, 2012). 
Early ridership forecasts anticipated 21,100 average weekday trips on the HealthLine, but 
this would be later revised to 13,500 (FTA, 2012). However, neither of these forecasts 
anticipated the substantial contraction of the regional economy in the late 2000s or the 
subsequent drop in area-wide transit ridership, which fell by 22% between 2007 and 2010 (FTA, 
2012). Actual average weekday ridership on the HealthLine as of 2012 was 14,300 trips, and 
ridership in the corridor has steadily grown since introduction of the HealthLine service, despite 
the system-wide reduction in ridership (FTA, 2012). 
Escondido, California 
Launched in June 2011 by the North County Transit District (NCTD), the Breeze Rapid 
service is a “BRT-lite” system that utilizes newly-built queue jump lanes at congested 
intersections, traffic signal priority for buses, and bus station improvements to provide a six-mile 
long branded rapid service in north San Diego County, California. In a 2006 concept study, 
NCTD estimated a capital cost of $2.42 million using 2005 dollars, or $2.79 million in 2011 
dollars when taking inflation into account. This translates to $0.47 million per mile in 2011, or 
$0.49 million in 2014.  However, upon opening, the project had a capital cost of $4.21 million 
($0.7 million per mile in 2011, or $0.73 in 2014), due in large part to an expansion of the scope 
of traffic improvements at one intersection, where a proposed queue jump lane that would have 
extended a partial receiving lane at the far end of an intersection was expanded into a full block 
widening (D. Veeh, personal communication, December 30, 2013). 
No formal ridership projection for the service was conducted. Being the first instance of a 
rapid bus service in the region, the San Diego Association of Governments, the regional planning 
agency for San Diego County, treated it as a technology and concept demonstration that 
upgraded an existing local bus route rather than a project to significantly boost ridership (D. 
Veeh, personal communication, December 30, 2013). Data shows that ridership on the Breeze 
Rapid increased 19% during the first year after the launch, compared to the 11% increase on the 
rest of the Breeze system over the same period (D. Veeh, personal communication, December 
30, 2013).
 Unfortunately, without a ridership estimate, I can’t count this system in my ridership 
analysis. 
Eugene, Oregon 
The Lane Transit District (LTD), the public transit authority serving Lane County, 
Oregon, initiated a bus rapid transit service called the Emerald Express (EmX) with the opening 
of a four mile line between the downtowns of Eugene and Springfield, Oregon in January 2007. 
The system has been noted as a BRT success story by the ITDP (Weinstock, Hook, Replogle, 
and Cruz, 2011), constructed within budget and with ridership far exceeding stated expectations. 
A 7.8 mile extension of the original line from Springfield to Gateway Mall opened in January 
2011, and more EmX lines are currently planned for the Eugene region. 
The EmX has so far consistently been implemented within budget. The initial four mile 
line was estimated to cost $24.6 million ($6.15 million per mile in 2007, or $6.96 million in 
2014), and this estimate proved to be accurate. The Gateway extension was estimated to cost 
$43.1 million or $5.53 million per mile in 2011 ($5.77 million in 2014), but actually came in 
under budget at $41.3 million, or $5.29 million per mile ($5.53 million in 2014) (A. Vobora, 
personal communication, February 8, 2014). Prior to the opening of the first segment, ridership 
was estimated to increase by 40% in the corridor over 20 years of service. Instead, it exceeded 
that level within the first year, with ridership in the corridor rising from 2,700 average weekday 
boardings to over 4,400 within the first year, peaking at 6,000 just prior to the opening of the 
Gateway extension in 2011. Ridership estimates for the Gateway extension were estimated to 
increase ridership along the entire EmX line by 3,700 additional weekday boardings. Within one 
year of the opening of the Gateway extension, ridership had reached 80% of this estimate, and 
exceeded it in the second year. Today, weekday ridership averages over 10,000 during the school 
year and exceeds 11,000 in some months, 135% of the estimate predicted for the line after 
completion of the Gateway extension (A. Vobora, personal communication, February 8, 2014). 
Kansas City, Missouri 
Following the successful implementation of a bus rapid transit line in Kansas City, 
branded the Metro Area Express (MAX), in July 2005, the Kansas City Area Transportation 
Authority began pursuing implementation of a 13-mile second line along Troost Avenue, 
roughly one mile west and parallel to the existing Main Street MAX line. As of 2007, the Main 
Street MAX line had resulted in a 20% growth in ridership along the Main Street corridor, and 
planners expected similar results from the new Troost Avenue line (FTA, 2007). The line was 
ultimately completed and opened for service in January 2011 (KCATA, 2012), slightly behind its 
original schedule of completion in late 2010 (FTA, 2007). Both lines utilize dedicated bus lanes, 
traffic signal prioritization, and branded buses and stations to provide a faster service than typical 
local bus service. 
As of 2007, the capital costs for the Troost line were estimated at $30.73 million in year 
of expenditure dollars (FTA, 2007), or $2.36 million per mile ($2.46 million in 2014). This 
proved to be slightly above the actual cost of $30.6 million (KCATA, 2010), or $2.35 million per 
mile ($2.45 million in 2014), meaning that the Troost line came in under budget. However, 
ridership fell slightly below expectations: in 2007, it was predicted that the new line would have 
9,000 average weekday boardings in its first year of service (FTA, 2007), but following one year 
of service, the Troost line had only 8,500 average weekday boardings (KCATA, 2012). 
London, United Kingdom 
Transport for London (TfL) implemented the first phase of a bus rapid transit project 
dubbed East London Transit, which opened in 2010. The project consisted of infrastructure 
improvements along the bus corridor between Ilford and Dagenham Dock via The Thames View 
Estate through East London, and involved the replacement of an existing route with two new 
routes, branded EL1 and EL2, service level enhancements, new bus-only sections, and a new 
service to Dagenham Dock station. The final capital cost of the project was £27.79 million 
(Jacob, G., personal communication, March 4, 2014); unfortunately, cost estimates for the 
project were not found. 
As of summer 2007, the “business case” justifying the project estimated that annual 
ridership would rise from 4.1 million on the existing bus route (as of FY 2007) to 6.2 million on 
the combined two new routes following completion of the project. In FY 2011, ridership on the 
two new routes was 6 million, and rose to 6.4 million in FY 2012 and FY 2013 (Jacob, G., 
personal communication, March 4, 2014), indicating that ridership has modestly exceeded 
expectations. 
Los Angeles, California 
Los Angeles’ primary public transit agency, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (Metro for short), operates two bus rapid transit lines: the Orange Line 
and the Silver Line. Metro also operates a rapid bus service called the Metro Rapid, which has 
some features of BRT, such as limited stop service and traffic priority at intersections, but for 
this analysis I will focus on the Orange and Silver Lines, as they are a more fully-fledged 
realization of “true” BRT. 
The Orange Line, regarded as one of the first “true” BRT systems in the United States, 
opened on October 29, 2005 and was constructed along a former Southern Pacific Railroad 
branch line through the San Fernando Valley. Originally running 14 miles between North 
Hollywood and Woodland Hills, a four mile extension to Chatsworth began construction in 2009 
and was completed in June 2012. 
Costs of construction for the Orange Line were generally within budget, though ridership 
was far above what was projected. The initial 14-mile stretch, which included a bikeway, cost 
$323.6 million (Callaghan and Vincent, 2007), or $23.11 million per mile ($27.78 million in 
2014), which was actually under the original $340.4 million announced by Metro (Metro, 2003), 
or $24.31 million per mile ($29.22 million in 2014). An additional $26 million was spent on an 
additional station on the line, which opened in December 2006 (Callaghan and Vincent, 2007). 
The Canoga extension, on the other hand, came in over the original announced budget. When 
first announced in 2006, it was projected to cost $135 million (Guccione, 2006) (Callaghan and 
Vincent, 2007), or $33.75 million per mile ($34.51 million in 2014), but at the start of 
construction that estimate was changed to $215.6 million. Following completion, however, 
Metro announced that it had cost $154 million, or $38.5 million per mile ($39.37 million in 
2014), far below their previous estimate but still above the originally announced number 
(Bloomekatz, 2012). 
Ridership on the Orange Line has consistently exceeded expectations. For the initial 
segment, Metro had projected 5,000 to 7,500 average weekday boardings for the first year of 
service, and 22,000 average weekday boardings by 2020. But in May 2006, only seven months 
after the start of service, the Orange Line carried 21,828 average weekday boardings, very close 
to their stated 2020 goal (Callaghan and Vincent, 2007). Ridership continued to grow, reaching 
nearly 24,000 average weekday boardings in October 2010 and 26,614 average weekday 
boardings in October 2011 (Hymon, 2012). The extension to Chatsworth was projected to 
generate an additional 9,000 average weekday boardings by 2030, and Metro projected that the 
entire line including the extension would carry 45,000 daily riders by 2030 (Anderson, 2012). 
Whether this goal will be met remains to be seen, but initial results are promising: Orange Line 
ridership rose from 26,670 in May 2012, one month prior to completion of the extension (D. 
Mieger, personal communication, December 18, 2013), to 32,069 in October 2012 (Hymon, 
2012) and 31,780 in October 2013 (D. Mieger, personal communication, December 18, 2013). 
The Silver Line, by contrast, is not a full-featured BRT system, instead utilizing high-
occupancy toll lanes rather than dedicated bus lanes for most of its length between El Monte and 
the Harbor Gateway area via Downtown Los Angeles. Additionally, the Silver Line lacks the off-
board fare collection system that the Orange Line has. Rather than being built all at once like the 
Orange Line, the Silver Line was incrementally developed from pre-existing bus services and 
utilized two existing transitway facilities: the El Monte Busway, which opened in 1973, and the 
Harbor Transitway, which opened in 1996. As a branded BRT service, the Silver Line only dates 
back to 2009 and was a consolidation of bus services that previously served these corridors. 
Following the start of service, Metro implemented the Metro ExpressLanes Demonstration 
Program in 2013, which converted the high-occupancy vehicle lanes on both transitways to the 
current high-occupancy toll lanes and included expansion of transit stations, purchase of new 
Silver Line buses, and installation of bus priority signals on surface streets in Downtown Los 
Angeles where the Silver Line operates.  
Because of these factors, there are no clear start and completion dates for implementation 
of the existing Silver Line service, and even when cost figures for the transitways are available it 
would be very difficult to isolate the Silver Line service from other bus services that utilize these 
facilities (D. Mieger, personal communication, December 18, 2013). As such, the cost and 
ridership figures I would have hoped to acquire have no useful beginning and end dates in the 
case of the Silver Line, so I have chosen to exclude it from my final analysis. 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
Opened on June 22, 2013, the METRO Red Line is a new 11-mile bus rapid transit 
service that utilizes bus-only shoulders along Cedar Avenue/State Highway 77 between the Twin 
City suburbs of Bloomington and Apple Valley, Minnesota, with plans for a further extension 
south to the community of Lakeville. Development of the project began with a study of the 
corridor in 1998 and construction began in 2011 before being completed in the summer of 2013. 
The project was faced with construction setbacks and the phasing of the project changed 
over time. The original plan was to implement the full Bloomington-Lakeville project in 4 
phases with various elements of capital and operating investment in each phase. However, the 
most recent plan switched the investment strategy to 3 phases and altered the timing of the 
elements included in each stage. Under this revised plan, the capital cost of the first phase of the 
project from Bloomington to Apple Valley was planned to be $118 million, or $10.73 million per 
mile ($10.81 million in 2014) and ended up costing $112 million, or $10.18 million per mile 
($10.26 million in 2014) (C. Hiniker, personal communication, December 17, 2013). 
However, while the construction costs came in under budget, operational costs for the 
system were cut back during construction, causing the initial roll-out of the system to be scaled 
back to a less frequent service than originally planned. The original planning forecast for 
opening day ridership was about 2,250 daily riders, but a new analysis taking into account the 
reduction in service revised the figure to about 960 average daily riders for the first year. 
However, after 5 months of operation, actual ridership is only at 835 daily riders, 87% of these 
revised annual projections for the first year, and only 37% of the original projections (C. Hiniker, 
personal communication, December 17, 2013). 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
The Port Authority of Allegheny County, the public transportation agency for the 
Pittsburgh region, owns and operates three separate bus-only highways. Rather than serving 
branded bus rapid transit service, Pittsburgh’s busways serve mostly local and suburban feeder 
bus routes that utilize the busways to bypass congested corridors to and from Downtown 
Pittsburgh. The first busway constructed, the South Busway, was completed in 1977 to serve the 
southern portions of Pittsburgh. The Martin Luther King Jr. East Busway, which connects 
Downtown Pittsburgh to the borough of Wilkinsburg, was constructed in 1983, with a 2.3 mile 
extension to the borough of Swissvale completed in 2003. The newest busway, the West 
Busway, connects Pittsburgh to the borough of Carnegie and was completed in 2000. Each of the 
three busways has several stations to serve the neighborhoods located along the route. Based on 
the availability of information, my analysis will focus on the most recent developments of the 
Pittsburgh busway system. 
A Federal Transit Administration evaluation of the West Busway, released in April 2003, 
found that the West Busway project came within the projected cost for the project, but only after 
significant changes to the proposal were made. Construction of the project, which includes six 
stations, was originally estimated at $328.8 million, or $40.59 million per mile ($55.34 million in 
2014), but the estimate rose to $515 million following issues with land acquisition from freight 
rail company CONRAIL and problems in the development of a proposed new HOV bridge over 
the Monongahela River into Downtown Pittsburgh. Ultimately, the CONRAIL land acquisition 
and proposed bridge elements were abandoned from the plan, bringing the cost estimate for the 
revised project down to $326.8 million, close to the original estimate. However, the project only 
remained within budget due to this significant scaling back of the original proposal, which was 
originally 8.1 miles but was scaled back to 5 miles (FTA, 2003), bringing the final cost per mile 
to $65.36 million ($89.11 million in 2014). Ridership on the West Busway, however, did meet 
expectations. The initial estimate of nearly 7,000 riders per day upon opening did prove to be 
accurate (FTA, 2003), and daily ridership on the busway reached a peak of 10,000 in 2004 
(Vincent, 2004) before leveling off in later years. 
The extension of the East Busway to Swissvale in 2003 was projected to cost $62.8 
million in year of expenditure dollars (FTA, 1998), or $27.3 million per mile ($34.83 million in 
2014), but this figure rose to $68.5 million by completion (TRB, 2001), or $29.78 million per 
mile ($38 million in 2014). It was also projected to add an additional 3,800 daily riders to the 
line by 2005 (FTA, 1998). As of 2001, prior to expansion, ridership on the East Busway was at 
28,000 daily riders (TRB, 2001), so an additional 3,800 riders would have given the entire 
busway a combined ridership of 31,800 riders. However, these estimates turned out to be far too 
optimistic. Ridership on the East Busway initially grew following expansion, but has actually 
fallen since; as of 2004, the East Busway carried an additional 2,000 daily riders, about 53% of 
projections, for a total of 30,000 daily riders (Vincent, 2004). But as of 2011, daily ridership on 
the entire East Busway had fallen to 25,600 (Weinstock, Hook, Replogle, and Cruz, 2011). This 
occurs at a time when annual ridership has fallen overall for the Port Authority of Allegheny 
County, dropping from 66 million passenger trips in 2001 to 63.8 million in 2011 (NTD, 2002 
and 2012). 
Reno, Nevada 
The Regional Transportation Commission of Washoe County (RTC) initiated a 4.5-mile 
“BRT-lite” service called the RTC RAPID along South Virginia Street in Reno, a corridor which 
has been targeted for transit oriented development by the City of Reno. Planning for the project 
began in 2001 and the system was implemented in three phases between 2009 and 2013, with 
each phase introducing more specialized BRT elements. Phase 1, which opened in fall 2009, 
included the replacement of existing local service with branded local and limited stop service and 
minor improvements such as bus stop enhancements and traffic priority signals. Phase 2, which 
opened in fall 2011, involved the acquisition of articulated buses and upgrading existing stops to 
BRT stations. Phase 3, which went into effect in fall 2013, involved enhancements to BRT 
stations, namely floor-level boarding platforms, wi-fi capability, and ticket vending machines for 
off-board fare collection (E. Park, personal communication, January 27, 2014). 
Total capital costs for the combined three phases were estimated at $13.43 million, or 
$2.98 million per mile ($3.26 million in 2014), but actually came out to $15.35 million ($3.41 
million per mile ($3.73 million in 2014). The majority of this was dedicated to the second phase 
of implementation, which cost $13.25 million (all figures in 2009 dollars), nearly $2 million 
above the projected $11.64 million. Most capital and operating costs were funded by federal 
Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality (CMAQ) funds, which proved essential to completing the 
project following service cuts in FY 2009 as a result of the Great Recession (E. Park, personal 
communication, January 27, 2014). 
The recession is also responsible for ridership falling short of projections made in the 
planning stage. In 2007, service on South Virginia Street was operating near capacity, creating a 
significant bus bunching problem. It was estimated that even without BRT, ridership along the 
corridor would continue to climb from the existing 1,782,106 annual boardings in FY 2007 to 
2,350,000 in FY 2010 (when RTC RAPID service began) and climbing to 2,720,419 in FY 2013. 
With BRT, it was estimated that there would be an additional 13.2% increase in ridership on the 
corridor, growing to 2,660,000 in FY 2010 and 3,079,283 in FY 2013 (R. Henson, personal 
communication, February 26, 2014). Instead, a system-wide reduction in ridership following the 
recession and service cuts meant that actual ridership on the corridor dropped to 1,665,702 in FY 
2010, and only rose to 1,822,018 by FY 2013. Indeed, following the recession and subsequent 
service cuts, ridership on the corridor didn’t rise to FY 2007 levels until FY 2012. Since 
introduction of the service, ridership has grown by almost 10% in the corridor; a modest 
increase, and perhaps still an accomplishment in light of the starting point at the height of the 
recession, but nevertheless the RTC RAPID fell far short of early ridership projections (R. 
Henson, personal communication, February 26, 2014). 
San Antonio, Texas 
San Antonio’s public transportation agency, VIA Metropolitan Transit (VIA for short), 
opened a “BRT-lite” service called VIA Primo in December 2012. VIA Primo is a branded 
service operating a 20-mile route along the Fredericksburg Road corridor using specially-bought 
vehicles, branded stations, and traffic signal prioritization for buses. Despite the relatively 
modest scope of the project compared to other BRT initiatives, it does represent a significant 
investment in public transportation for San Antonio. 
At the time of the decision to build in 2009, capital costs for the project were estimated to 
be $40.1 million in 2012 dollars, or $2.01 million per mile ($2.06 million in 2014) at the end of 
construction. The actual capital costs for the project at completion were $35 million, or $1.75 
million per mile ($1.79 million in 2014), 87% of the estimated cost when adjusting for inflation. 
Ridership was estimated to be 5,000 to 8,000 riders daily following one year of operation; after 
one year of operation, actual ridership was 5,800 riders daily, a modest amount but still within 
expectations (J. Aguilera, personal communication, February 7, 2014). 
Snohomish County, Washington 
Community Transit opened a BRT service called Swift in November 2009, which 
operates a 16.7 mile line along State Road 99 between Aurora and Everett, Washington. The 
service utilizes seven miles of transit-only lanes, traffic signal priority, articulated buses, and 
branded stations with pre-boarding fare collection. 
The Swift project was completed over the initial budget. When announced in 2005, the 
project was estimated to cost $15-20 million (Community Transit, 2005), or $1.2 million per 
mile ($1.31 million in 2014), but was actually completed at a cost of $29 million, or $1.74 
million per mile ($1.9 million in 2014). Additionally, four stations that were included in the 
original plan were deferred due to funding issues and not completed until 2011 (Community 
Transit, 2011). However, ridership has also exceeded expectations: a 2004 study by Community 
Transit predicted that Swift would reach 2,500 boardings per weekday after one year of service, 
and 4,000 per weekday after four years of service (Duke, 2010). Actual ridership after one year 
was 3,500 boardings per weekday (Duke, 2010), and after four years that number had grown to 
4,400 (Munguia, 2013), 110% of the projected amount for this time. Surprisingly enough, this 
growth in ridership occurred despite a system-wide reduction in ridership (Munguia, 2010) and 
service cuts in 2010 and 2012, which reduced service frequency and operating hours for the BRT 
service (Munguia, 2012). Annual ridership for Community Transit dropped from 11.4 million in 
2009 to 9.1 million in 2012 (NTD, 2010 and 2013), making the growth of Swift ridership that 
much more remarkable. 
Sydney, Australia 
Built and owned by the State Government of New South Wales, the Liverpool to 
Parramatta Transitway was the first of a planned network of busways for Western Sydney. First 
announced in 1998, it was completed and opened in February 2003 and branded as the “T-way,” 
short for “transitway” and after opening served buses operated by Western Sydney Buses, a 
subsidiary company of the private public transit operator State Transit Authority. The transitway 
is a 31 km (19.3 miles) facility, made up of 20 km of bus-only roads and 11 km of dedicated bus 
lanes, that link the communities of Liverpool and Parramatta with a series of intermediate 
destinations (Audit Office of NSW, 2005). 
The cost of the project grew substantially from what was first announced, rising from an 
estimated AUD $98 million, or AUD $5.08 million per mile (USD $6.02 million in 2014), when 
first announced to a final cost of AUD $346 million, or AUD $17.93 million per mile (USD 
$21.25 million in 2014), upon completion (Audit Office of NSW, 2005). A lack of feasibility 
assessment prior to the decision to build was largely responsible for the increased costs; the 
scope of the project expanded from a 20 km transitway to 31 km of transitway following a 
formal feasibility assessment. Additionally, modifications to the project following an 
environmental impact assessment and subsequent court challenge added costs and delayed the 
project, and higher construction costs came as a result of the delay (Audit Office of NSW, 2005). 
Ridership has fallen far below projections. Initial estimates predicted 4.3 million annual 
passenger trips after opening, and it was on this basis that the project moved forward. However, 
revised estimates were made when private operators made bids for the contract, with the State 
Transit Authority releasing a revised projection of 2.8 million annual passenger trips, only 65% 
of the initial estimate. Even this was far above the actual annual ridership for FY 2005, a couple 
years after opening: 1.7 million passenger trips, only 40% of the initial estimate (Audit Office of 
NSW, 2005). This has been blamed in large part on a lack of coordination between area transit 
operators, which prevented maximizing usage of the transitway (Audit Office of NSW, 2005). 
Following bus system reforms, ridership did rise on the transitway, reaching 2.77 million 
passenger trips in FY 2012 (Transport for NSW, 2012), but this still falls below planning 
projections. 
Winnipeg, Manitoba 
The Southwest Transitway, opened in April 2012, is a 3.6 km (2.2 miles) dedicated 
busway that links Downtown Winnipeg to southwest Winnipeg. The facility is operated by 
Winnipeg Transit and serves 13 bus routes that operate between Downtown and various 
destinations in southwest Winnipeg, which are collectively branded as Winnipeg Rapid Transit. 
Three stations are located along the transitway, and plans are in place for the transitway to be 
extended south to the campus of the University of Manitoba. 
The project was completed at its initial estimated budget of CAN $138 million (P. 
Wiwchar, personal communication, February 5, 2014), or CAN $62.73 million per mile (USD 
$56.92 million in 2014). Unfortunately, Winnipeg Transit refused to release any ridership info on 
the project, stating that ridership figures were for internal analysis only (P. Wiwchar, personal 
communication, February 5, 2014). As such, only the cost information for the Southwest 
Transitway will be included in my final analysis. 
Results 
 The following table summarizes the results of this analysis, comparing the predicted and 
actual costs in constant US dollars per mile, and the predicted and actual ridership. 
Table 1: Summary of Individual Case Studies 
City Project name
System 
type
Year 
opened
Length 
(in miles)
Predicted 
cost per mile 
(in millions, 
2014 USD)
Actual cost 
per mile (in 
millions, 
2014 USD)
Actual total 
cost as % of 
Predicted 
total cost
Predicted 
ridership
Actual 
ridership
Actual 
ridership as 
% of 
Predicted 
ridership
Auckland Northern Busway Busway 2008 3.9 $29.89 $44.77 150%
Cambridgeshire
Cambridgeshire Guided 
Busway Busway 2011 16 $12.55 $16.45 131% 1.75 mil/yr 2.5 mil/yr 143%
Cleveland HealthLine BRT 2008 7.1 $41.99 $30.28 72% 21,100/day 14,300/day 68%
Escondido Breeze Rapid BRT-lite 2011 6 $0.49 $0.73 151%
Eugene Emerald Express BRT 2007 4 $6.96 $6.96 100%
Increase by 
40% in 20 
years
Increase by 
222% in 4 
years 200+%
Eugene
Emerald Express 
Gateway Ext. BRT 2011 7.8 $5.77 $5.53 96% 3,700/day 5,000/day 135%
Kansas City MAX Troost Line BRT-lite 2011 13 $2.46 $2.45 100% 9,000/day 8,500/day 95%
London
East London Transit 
Phase 1 BRT 2010 6.2 mil/yr 6.4 mil/yr 103%
Los Angeles Orange Line BRT 2005 14 $29.22 $27.78 95%
5,000-
7,500/day 21,828/day 200+%
Los Angeles Orange Line Canoga Ext. BRT 2012 4 $34.51 $39.37 114%
Minneapolis METRO Red Line BRT-lite 2013 11 $10.81 $10.26 95% 2,250/day 835/day 37%
Pittsburgh West Busway Busway 2000 5 $55.34* $89.11 99% ~7,000/day 7,000/day 100%
Pittsburgh East Busway Ext. Busway 2003 2.3 $34.83 $38 109% 3,800/day 2,000/day 53%
Reno RTC RAPID BRT-lite 2009 4.5 $3.26 $3.73 114% 3.1 mil/yr 1.8 mil/yr 59%
San Antonio VIA Primo BRT-lite 2012 20 $2.06 $1.79 87%
5,000-
8,000/day 5,800/day 100%
Snohomish 
County Swift BRT-lite 2009 16.7 $1.31 $1.90 145% 4,000/day 4,400/day 110%
Sydney
Liverpool to Parramatta 
Transitway Busway 2003 19.3 $6.02 $21.25 353% 4.3 mil/yr 1.7 mil/yr 40%
Winnipeg Southwest Transitway Busway 2012 2.2 $56.92 $56.92 100%
*Original proposal was for an 8.1 mile project
Median predicted cost per mile: $8.89 Average predicted cost per mile: $17.44
Median actual cost per mile: $16.45 Average actual cost per mile: $23.37
As expected, the BRT projects studied generally had more accurate cost estimates than 
the urban rail projects that Flyvbjerg studied. Of the 17 projects for which adequate cost 
information could be obtained, the actual capital costs of seven came within 5% of their 
projected cost, while 11 came within 15% of their projected cost. However, while there were a 
high number of accurate or nearly accurate cost forecasts, the data also shows a propensity 
towards projects coming in over their estimated budget, with eight exceeding the projected cost 
by at least 5%, compared to only two that underestimated it by at least 5% (Figure 1). Of the 
projects described, those that were far over budget (at least 15% over) were either busways, 
which have relatively high capital costs, or BRT-lite systems which had such low capital costs 
that even a difference of a few million dollars had a large proportional effect. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of actual cost as a percentage of predicted cost 
 When it comes to ridership estimates, however, the overall picture is much different. Of 
the 14 projects for which adequate ridership data could be obtained, only four came within 10% 
of their projected ridership. Unlike the cost estimates, which had a propensity for being under the 
actual cost, the ridership estimates were pretty evenly distributed between those that were higher 
and lower than the actual ridership. This proved true regardless of whether the project was a 
busway, a BRT line, or BRT-lite (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of actual ridership as percentage of predicted ridership 
Discussion 
The propensity towards projects coming in over-budget among those systems studied 
suggests that BRT may suffer from some of the same cost estimate inaccuracies as the urban rail 
 projects Flyvbjerg studied, albeit to a lesser extent given the relatively high number of projects in 
which the accuracy of the estimated costs was very good. 
However, while there was a high level of accuracy in the cost estimates, it is worth noting 
that in some cases these BRT projects only came within budget due to a scaling back of the 
project from what was initially proposed. This was particularly evident in the case of the Western 
Busway in Pittsburgh, where the scope of the project was significantly reduced, and to a lesser 
extent with the HealthLine in Cleveland, when the expense of certain design elements was scaled 
back. 
While the ridership estimates were more evenly distributed between those that came 
above and those below the actual figures, there was far less accuracy overall than in the cost 
estimates. This illustrates the great difficulty in accurately predicting transit ridership. But a 
common theme among several of these projects was the effect of the Great Recession on the 
actual ridership figures: in Cleveland, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, and Reno, overall transit 
ridership dropped as a result of the recession and subsequent cuts to transit service, likely a 
major factor in causing new BRT projects in these cities to fail to live up to ridership 
expectations. While some BRT projects exceeded ridership expectations despite the recession, 
such as those in Eugene, Oregon and Snohomish County, Washington, the Great Recession 
clearly had a major impact on the outcome of many transit projects. 
Drawbacks 
The primary drawback with this research is the number of BRT projects this analysis 
covers. Of the more than 40 BRT projects I attempted to obtain data on, I was only able to find 
reliable and comparable cost data for 17 BRT projects, and suitable ridership data was obtained 
for only 14. What’s more, the responses received revealed a variety of different approaches to 
 ridership figures; besides different timelines and methodologies employed by the transit 
agencies, there were instances like the case of Escondido, California, where the lack of ridership 
estimates illustrated a project in which ridership growth was not a significant goal of their BRT 
system. The sample size of BRT projects here means that while this research may pick up on 
trends among BRT systems, it doesn’t serve as conclusive evidence of wider characteristics 
among bus rapid transit projects. Further research would be necessary to draw firmer conclusions 
about the nature of bus rapid transit cost and ridership projections. 
Another drawback with this research is the heavy focus on American BRT systems. In 
part, this is a natural consequence of the geographical distribution of BRT systems between these 
countries: there are simply more BRT systems in the United States than there are in Canada, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, or New Zealand. This research dealt with BRT as a technological 
choice, much like Flyvbjerg’s research treated urban rail projects, regardless of their location. 
However, this ignored the fact that BRT is treated differently between these countries: in the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, BRT projects usually take the form of dedicated 
busways or guided busway systems, while in the U.S. and Canada, BRT projects are a mixture of 
busways, “true” BRT, and BRT-lite systems, reflecting not only different approaches to BRT 
system design but also the difference in costs and potential expectations involved with such 
investment. There’s also the matter that there are different approaches to bus transit planning 
between these countries; in the U.S. and Canada, planning and operations are usually done by 
public agencies, while in Australia and the U.K., operations are typically handled by private 
contractors. Due to these different characteristics, more examples of BRT projects in Canada, 
Australia, and the U.K. would have been desirable to give a more complete view of BRT 
application in these countries. 
 Conclusions 
From this analysis, we can see some intriguing trends in bus rapid transit projects that 
suggest drawbacks in current approaches to cost and ridership forecasts for bus rapid transit 
systems. In particular, the propensity towards over budgeted projects among those studied and 
the wide inaccuracy of ridership projections are worth further consideration. 
While the cost estimates of the bus rapid transit projects studied tended to be more 
accurate than the urban rail projects Flyvbjerg studied, the propensity of them towards being 
completed over budget suggests that bus rapid transit projects could potentially suffer from some 
of the same cost estimate problems as urban rail projects. It may be worth seeing if other bus 
rapid transit projects reflect this skewed distribution in the accuracy of their cost estimates. 
Bus rapid transit projects did show even distribution in terms of the accuracy of ridership 
estimates, although the widespread inaccuracy among the projects studied suggests that the 
accuracy of these estimates leave much to be desired. Two major factors come into play here: the 
inherent difficulty with accurately predicting transit ridership, and the effects of the Great 
Recession on overall transit ridership. With so many new bus rapid transit projects under 
construction and opening in the years to come, it would be interesting to see if these trends hold 
for new bus rapid transit projects. 
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